LEAD · GEOPOLITICS

Turkey’s own 1945 declaration and a string of paper wars show what a formal state of war changes for straits, shipping and markets without a shot.

ABOUT 9 MINUTES

A declaration of war is a legal act, not a military one. History is full of states that issued one and never fired. That raises a question few briefings ask about the Aegean: what would change if a declaration came and nothing else did? This is a thought experiment, not a forecast. Neither government has proposed it, and in the Athens Declaration of Dec. 7, 2023 both committed to “refrain from any statement, initiative or act likely to undermine or discredit the letter and spirit of this Declaration or endanger the maintenance of peace and stability in their region” ^[1].

The question is less abstract this week. On Wednesday, three sea drones hit the Contship Jet, a Liberian-flagged, Greek-managed container ship, about 21 nautical miles off Bulgaria. It sank around midnight, and all 18 crew were rescued. It was the fifth ship hit by drones in Bulgaria’s exclusive economic zone, and no attacker has been officially named. ^[2][3][4][5] On Thursday, Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis told Reuters that chartering and insurance costs had “gone through the roof.” ^[6] That is what a war fought at sea does to shipping. What a war declared only on paper would do is the subject here.

THE 1995 RESOLUTION, IN BOTH CAPITALS’ WORDS

On June 8, 1995, after Greece ratified the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, Turkey’s Grand National Assembly unanimously adopted a declaration on the Aegean. It set out Ankara’s arithmetic: Greece’s territorial waters cover 43.68% of the Aegean at 6 nautical miles and would cover about 72% at 12. Should Greece extend beyond six, the Assembly resolved to give the government “all powers, including those deemed necessary militarily,” to defend the country’s “vital interests,” and to convey this to the Greek and world public “with friendly feelings” (translated by The Other Post) ^[7]. Turkey’s Foreign Ministry said in 2018: “We cannot tolerate any step that is not based on mutual consent in the Aegean Sea where two countries have opposite coasts. The declaration of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, dated 8 June 1995, contains a necessary political warning and is still in force today” ^[8].

Greece’s Foreign Ministry calls the resolution a casus belli. It describes 12 miles as a “sovereign right which can be unilaterally exercised” under the convention and notes that Turkey has applied 12 miles in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean since 1964 ^[9]. A Greek ministry spokesman has said the threat “falls outside the bounds of international legality and the UN Charter” and that its “retraction” is “an obligation on the part of Turkey” ^[10]. Greece extended its waters to 12 miles in the Ionian Sea in January 2021; Turkey’s Foreign Ministry said that step did not affect the Aegean and restated its opposition to any unilateral move there ^[11][12].

WARS ON PAPER

The clearest precedent is Turkey’s own. On Feb. 23, 1945, the Assembly unanimously declared war on Germany and Japan, and the decision appeared in the Official Gazette the next day ^[13]. Turkish forces fought no battles. The motive was the San Francisco conference: Britain’s Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, told Parliament that invitations went to states that had declared war and adhered to the UN Declaration by March 1 ^[14]. Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia declared in the same weeks; Saudi Arabia, which Britain had asked not to declare in 1943, announced itself “in a state of war” on Feb. 28 ^[14][15]. Argentina followed on March 27, 1945, without mobilizing ^[16].

Other paper wars lasted longer. Iraq signed no armistice with Israel in 1949 and remains formally at war with it, while Lebanon signed one but keeps a 1955 boycott law banning dealings with Israel ^[17]. In western Europe, Britain and France declared war on Germany in September 1939 and waged little land war until May 1940. The French Saar offensive advanced about 8 kilometers and withdrew, though the war at sea was real, Britain’s Imperial War Museums notes ^[18]. Mexico is a caution against neat categories: it declared war on May 22, 1942, after U-boats sank two of its tankers, and its Squadron 201 later flew combat missions in the Philippines ^[19][20].

Three famous cases are myths. Andorra did not declare war on Germany in 1914; the story began in North American newspapers in 1958, and Andorra’s archives show no state of war ^[21]. Berwick-upon-Tweed was not left out of the 1856 peace with Russia; neither the declaration nor the treaty names it, and a 1965 Foreign Office check found nothing ^[22]. The Isles of Scilly’s “335 Years’ War” with the Netherlands rests on thin evidence; the Dutch ambassador “ended” it in 1986 as a goodwill gesture ^[23].

Declared, not fought: paper wars since 1939, and what the Montreux, NATO and EU texts say. Graphic: The Other Post.

PROFILE: THE ENVOY WHO KEPT A DECLARATION IN HIS DESK

On Jan. 25, 1942, Thailand declared war on the United States and Britain. Its minister in Washington, Seni Pramoj, refused to deliver it to the State Department, U.S. diplomatic records show ^[24]. Washington never declared war on Thailand, while Britain treated itself as at war ^[24]. Seni later served as Thailand’s prime minister. One diplomat’s choice shaped how two allies treated the same country for the rest of the war.

WHAT A DECLARATION CHANGES ON DAY ONE

The law. The 1907 Hague Convention III requires “previous and explicit warning” before hostilities and prompt notice to neutral powers ^[25]. The UN Charter bans “the threat or use of force” (Article 2(4)) and allows self-defense “if an armed attack occurs” (Article 51) ^[26]. The Geneva Conventions apply “to all cases of declared war,” even if one side does not recognize the state of war ^[27]. A declaration alone therefore switches on parts of the law of war, including rules on enemy nationals, before any fighting.

The Straits. The 1936 Montreux Convention is where a paper war bites hardest ^[28]. Under Article 5, with Turkey belligerent, merchant ships “not belonging to a country at war with Turkey” keep freedom of transit, provided they “do not in any way assist the enemy,” and they enter by day on routes Turkey sets. Article 6 applies similar daytime routing when Turkey considers itself threatened with imminent danger of war. Under Article 20, warship passage “shall be left entirely to the discretion of the Turkish Government.” Article 21 lets Turkey apply that discretion when it considers itself threatened with imminent danger of war, subject to a review mechanism built around the League of Nations, which no longer exists. Turkey has shown it applies the convention quickly: it closed the Straits to belligerent warships under Article 19 days after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine ^[29].

Shipping. Greek owners control 19.1% of world tonnage, the Union of Greek Shipowners reports, much of it under foreign flags ^[30]. The convention does not define “belonging”; whether a Greek-owned ship under another flag would count is an open question, and we found no case that settles it. Underwriters would not wait for the answer. The London market’s Joint War Committee lists areas where additional war-risk premiums apply; in the Red Sea in 2024 those premiums ran from about 0.5% to 1% of a ship’s value and reached about 2% in September, Reuters reported ^[31].

Alliances. Both countries are NATO members. Article 5 is triggered by “an armed attack,” and Article 4 provides for consultations when a member’s security “is threatened” ^[32]. Only Greece is in the EU, whose Article 42.7 applies when a member “is the victim of armed aggression on its territory” ^[33]; France is the only state to have invoked it, after the Paris attacks of November 2015 ^[34]. A declaration without force would meet neither text, leaving both alliances to act through politics, not treaty obligations.

Air and sea traffic. The Chicago Convention on civil aviation says that “in case of war” its provisions do not affect the “freedom of action” of states affected, as belligerents or neutrals ^[35]. That matters over an Aegean where the two sides already disagree on airspace: Greece claims 10 miles of national airspace, which Turkey does not accept beyond six, and Turkey disputes aspects of the Athens Flight Information Region ^[36]. Each side already issues NAVTEX navigational warnings over the same waters; during the 2020 standoff over the Turkish survey ship Oruç Reis, a Greek and a Turkish frigate collided ^[37].

Trade, people and property. Trade between the two reached $6.7 billion in 2025 against a $10 billion target, and the leaders signed a joint declaration in February 2026 ^[38][39]. A state of war would test that directly. History is a guide here, not a prediction: in March 1964, during the Cyprus crisis and with no war declared, Turkey denounced the 1930 Convention of Establishment, Commerce and Navigation and expelled about 12,000 Greek nationals, whose assets were frozen, according to a Turkish academic study ^[40].

Markets. Moody’s restored Greece to investment grade in March 2025 and listed a material worsening of geopolitical risk among factors that could pressure the rating ^[41]. It raised Turkey to Ba3 in July 2025, citing more credible policy ^[42].

POSSIBLE GAINS AND LOSSES

Our reading of the sources cited, for a declaration with no use of force; not a forecast.

Both sides would lose more than they gain from a declaration alone

Source: The Other Post’s reading of the treaties, statements and data cited in this article.

BEST MOVES

WHAT TO WATCH

IN BRIEF

TURKEY · EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN

Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis told Reuters on Thursday that the 2019 maritime memorandum between Turkey and Libya is “blatantly illegal, null and void” and “completely disregards the geography,” in an interview first reported by Reuters. He urged Libya to negotiate its boundary with Athens and said there was “no risk” to the Chevron-led exploration license south of Crete. ^[6]

Libya’s eastern-based House of Representatives approved the memorandum on Oct. 20 and lifted its 2020 rejection. ^[43][44] The EU said the next day that the memorandum cannot affect the rights of third states. ^[47] President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan called the vote “extremely pleasing news.” On Monday he said the criticism had “no legitimate basis,” that Ankara was “not seeking to score points,” and that the region’s disputes should be settled through dialogue. ^[45][46][48]

The move: If you hold or bid for offshore blocks between Crete and Libya, ask your counsel which boundary each license assumes, and watch for any talks between Athens and Libya.

GEOPOLITICS · CANADA

European Union and Canadian leaders end their summit in Montreal today without the “associate member” status that Commission President Ursula von der Leyen had floated for Canada. Germany led the member states that objected. ^[49][50] The joint declaration, due to be published today, instead commits both sides to “ever closer association,” with its form to be set by the 2027 summit, under a new “Alliance for the Future.” ^[49][51]

The text also covers subsea cables, a joint feasibility study on Canadian LNG for Europe, youth mobility, and says both sides “deeply regret” U.S. sanctions on the International Criminal Court. Prime Minister Mark Carney said “it doesn’t matter about specific names or nomenclature.” Canada sends nearly 70% of its exports to the United States; the EU is about 9% of its trade. ^[49][52]

The move: If you trade between Canada and Europe, read the final declaration’s energy and cable sections first; they show where rules may line up soonest.

ENERGY · CENTRAL ASIA

Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov said on Oct. 25 that construction of the Kambarata-1 hydropower plant could begin in 2027 or 2028 and take five to six years, at a cost of about $4.2 billion. No construction schedule has been confirmed. ^[54]

The World Bank describes a 1,860 MW plant behind a 261-meter dam, producing about 6,000 GWh a year. Kyrgyzstan would own 34%, and Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan 33% each. The bank has given $18.6 million for preparation and is preparing up to $1.5 billion in financing; an intergovernmental agreement is due in 2025–26. ^[53] Kyrgyzstan has asked the EBRD for technical help. ^[55] All three owners are members of the Organization of Turkic States, whose leaders meet in Ankara today. ^[56]

The move: If you supply or finance power projects in Central Asia, track the agreement’s ratification and the World Bank board’s vote; both come before any tender.

PROFILE

Saddam Haftar, 35, is his father’s deputy and the east’s envoy. His parliament has just approved the sea deal it rejected in 2020, and he calls Turkey a long-term partner.

Saddam Haftar at the State Department in Washington, June 29, 2026. Photo: Freddie Everett/U.S. Department of State, public domain, via Wikimedia Commons; cropped and toned

Saddam Haftar was born in Benghazi in 1991, the youngest of seven children of Khalifa Haftar, whose Libyan National Army holds the east and south of the country. He holds Libyan and U.S. citizenship and has long been seen as his father’s likely successor. ^[57] He made his name commanding the Tariq Ben Zeyad Brigade from 2016, and in August 2025 the House of Representatives approved him as the army’s deputy commander-in-chief. ^[57][58]

His father’s forces fought the Tripoli government that Turkey backed in 2019 and 2020. Five years later, Saddam Haftar became the east’s channel to Ankara. His visit in April 2025, hosted by the Chief of General Staff, Gen. Selçuk Bayraktaroğlu, and including talks with Defense Minister Yaşar Güler, marked a shift in Turkey’s Libya policy, Defense News wrote. ^[59] Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan received him in Ankara on July 24. ^[60] After the eastern parliament approved the 2019 maritime memorandum on Oct. 20, he said it opened the door to a “long-term” partnership with Turkey as “an influential regional power.” ^[61] In June he met U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio in Washington. ^[62]

His record follows him. In December 2022, Amnesty International said the brigade he led had committed unlawful killings, torture and enforced disappearances, named him as its effective leader and called for investigations of its commanders. ^[63][64] In August 2024 he was briefly questioned in Europe over a Spanish arrest warrant tied to an arms-smuggling investigation and released; days later the Sharara oilfield, Libya’s largest, shut down. ^[65][66]

The move: If you do business in eastern Libya, assume that security approvals and big contracts run through the Haftar command, and that Ankara now has a direct line to it.

TURKEY · DEFENSE

Intelligence Online reported on Thursday that Turkish manufacturers are “on the verge of securing contracts that others failed to fulfil on time” in Manila, according to its public brief. ^[67] The newsletter reported on Oct. 13 that MBDA’s missile deliveries for the Philippines’ two South Korean-built frigates were lagging. ^[68] A Turkish relay of Thursday’s brief names no system, company or date. ^[69]

What the brief leaves out is that Turkish hardware is already on those ships. The two 3,200-ton Miguel Malvar-class frigates, built by HD Hyundai Heavy Industries, carry Aselsan’s Gökdeniz close-in weapon system alongside 16 VL MICA cells, eight C-Star anti-ship missiles and a 76 mm gun. ^[70][71] Next door, Malaysia signed in April for 24 Roketsan Atmaca missiles. ^[72]

Turkish naval weapons are already at sea in Southeast Asia

Sources: USNI News, Naval News, Malaysian Defence, Intelligence Online.

Turkey’s defense and aerospace exports reached $6.93 billion in January–September, up 15.6% on a year earlier, and $10.94 billion over 12 months, said Haluk Görgün, head of the Defense Industry Agency. ^[73]

The move: If you sell naval systems in Southeast Asia, count Turkish firms as rivals on delivery dates, not just on price.

TURKEY · HERITAGE

A fairy chimney collapsed near the entrance to the Göreme Open-Air Museum in Cappadocia at about 3:15 p.m. on Thursday, Republic Day, after heavy rain. Three people died, a Turkish couple and a French visitor, and five were injured; four have left hospital, Nevşehir Governor Hüseyin Kök said. ^[75][76]

Nevşehir’s chief prosecutor has opened an investigation and appointed five experts, and the governor’s office is opening an administrative inquiry. ^[76] Göreme has been on UNESCO’s World Heritage List since 1985 and drew about 4.5 million visitors in 2025, AFP reported. ^[74]

The move: If you are sending staff or guests to Cappadocia, ask your operator which sites are closed and how it checks them after heavy rain.

GADGET

Samsung’s Galaxy Buds On are open-ear earbuds that clip onto the ear rather than sit inside it, so you still hear traffic and colleagues. Each weighs 6.65 grams. Samsung claims 9.5 hours of playback, or 38 hours with the case, and says an “Audio Leakage Reduction” design keeps sound from spilling to people nearby. ^[77]

They run Gemini Live hands-free for users 18 and older, answer calls with head gestures, use Bluetooth 6.2 and are rated IP54. They work with Android 12 or later, with some features only on Samsung phones. They cost $229 in black, in the United States from early November. ^[77]

The move: If you take calls on the move, test one on a crowded street; open-ear buds trade some privacy on calls for awareness.

LISTEN

The Daily (The New York Times) · Thu., Oct. 29 · 27 min

A Times investigation found how two candidates named Dan Sullivan ended up on the ballot for the U.S. Senate in Alaska, and the secret role Democrats played in it. Kellen Browning explains the scheme and what it means for a race that could decide control of the Senate. Alaska’s governor has since ordered an investigation into Mary Peltola’s campaign. ^[78] A sharp case study in how ballot rules can be gamed days before a vote.

Listen to the episode →

LISTEN

One Decision · Thu., Oct. 29

The political scientist Ian Bremmer tells Sir Richard Dearlove, the former head of MI6, and John Raine that he thinks President Trump is past his peak and that Democrats are likely to win the midterms, with investigations to follow. He sets out his scenarios for Iran after the vote, explains how a Democratic Congress could use its power of the purse on Ukraine, and names AI leaders under valuation pressure as a risk to watch. ^[79] One forecast to test against next week’s results.

Listen to the episode →

READ

Sam Wasson · Harper · Oct. 27, 2026 · 752 pages

A full biography of the director of “It’s a Wonderful Life” and “Mr. Smith Goes to Washington,” from Sicilian immigrant child to the most powerful filmmaker in Hollywood. The Los Angeles Times called it a paean to the filmmaker. ^[80][81] Long, but a study of how one man turned a nation’s self-image into a career.

See it on Amazon →

READ

Wanda M. Corn · Princeton University Press · Oct. 27, 2026 · 312 pages

The Stanford art historian traces Grant Wood’s 1930 painting from an Iowa studio to one of the most parodied images in America, with 240 color illustrations. AirMail called it “art history at its best—smart, accessible, and utterly captivating.” ^[82][83][84] A fine study of how an image escapes its maker and becomes a brand.

See it on Amazon →

Every pick links to the original. Our note says why it is worth your time; the work is theirs.

SOURCES: FRONT PAGE 1–56 · THE OTHER PAGE 57–77 · YET ANOTHER PAGE 78–84 (ACCESSED OCT. 30, 2026)

Map data: © OpenStreetMap contributors (ODbL), Natural Earth (public domain) · Map: The Other Post

The Other Post: The Daily Briefing for the Conscientious Leader, through an Istanbul lens is independent analysis for decision-makers. Nothing here is investment, legal or medical advice. Issue No. 16 · © 2026 The Other Post